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Although Twitter is regarded as one of the most potent sources
of vaccine-related disinformation, relatively little is known about how
Twitter constructs timelines for individual users. In this work, we
examine the composition of the Twitter timeline conditioned on the
initial selection of friends. We illustrate our method by analyzing
how the initial selection of friends impacts the number of pro- and
anti-vaccination information present in the timeline. Our experiment
clearly shows the disproportionate prevalence of anti-vaccination con-
tent seeping into Twitter timelines even for accounts initialized with
explicitly pro-vaccination friends. We also discuss ethical considera-




Over the recent years, Twitter has become one of the leading channels of
disinformation dissemination. The success of the global fight against the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic depends on the efficacy of vaccination campaigns,
yet anti-vaccination propaganda is constantly being spread on Twitter. This
spread can be amplified by internal Twitter recommendation algorithms con-
structing timelines, and the details of these algorithms remain hidden from
the public.
The contents visible to users, i.e., the Twitter timeline, are generated by
a sophisticated algorithm that tries to maximize users’ engagement with the
service. The details of the algorithm responsible for creating the timeline are
not publicly available; thus, the observation remains the only experimental
method useful for the public. In this work, we are using the Twitter API
to read snapshots of the timeline. We must stress that the composition
of the timeline visible via Twitter API is not necessarily identical to the
composition of the timeline visible to regular users of the service. According
to the Twitter API documentation, ”The endpoint returns a collection of
the most recent Tweets and Retweets posted by the authenticating user and
the users they follow.” Our method retrieves the entire timeline accessible to
a bot at a given point in time. This does not reflect the pattern in which
regular Twitter users access the service. In the remainder of the paper, we
make the simplifying assumption that the timeline represents the stream of
tweets a regular human user would see. Still, one should remember that there
may be considerable differences between the view exposed via Twitter API
and the view exposed via the regular service interface.
Due to tweets’ brevity and domain-specific language (hashtags, URLs,
acronyms, neologisms), it is relatively hard to distinguish between human-
generated and bot-generated content. Unfortunately, the contents of tweets
and their origin are not the only things contributing to disinformation dis-
semination. Behavioral events, like re-tweeting, following, un-following (both
genuinely originating from humans and resulting from the algorithmic pro-
cedure built into bots) can be easily mistaken for clues of social acceptance
and support for fringe ideas and anti-scientific stances.
In this paper, we introduce a new method of analyzing the social impact of
Twitter via experimental observation using passive bots. We create multiple
bots that periodically check their timelines and download all tweets contained
in those timelines. The bots execute in the same time period, and their only
difference is the composition of the initial seed set of followed accounts (i.e.,
friends). Although we use the live Twitter ecosystem, our method is almost
non-intrusive. The only potential impact of our bots comes from social signals
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produced by the fact that the bot starts following an account.
The experimental scheme presented in this paper can be easily extended
to cover any contentious and divisive subject discussed on Twitter. As the
use case proving the viability and usefulness of our approach, we choose to
examine the number of pro- and anti-vaccination information presented to
a user conditioned on the initial set of friends. We create five bots that
significantly differ in the initial seed set of followed accounts, and we allow
our bots to access Twitter’s timeline a few times a day during the period of
one week. We carefully examine the profile of tweets observed during this
period and draw conclusions about the composition of timelines.
Despite recent interest in trustworthy and ethical artificial intelligence,
ethical considerations related to research methodologies are often overlooked
in computer science. To encourage other researchers to take ethics seriously,
we extend our paper with an entire section dedicated to ethical considerations
of using automated bots to conduct experiments in a real social network
environment, with human users being a part of the experiment.
2 Related Work
From the very start of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, Twitter has been scruti-
nized as one of the primary engines for spreading disinformation about the
pandemic, vaccines, and public health8,17,18. Our work draws inspiration
from3, where the authors employ a similar technique to gather observational
data from Twitter. The main difference is that the authors focused on the
social network analysis, especially on how social interactions such as mention-
ing and re-tweeting differ in groups of anti-vaxxers and pro-vaxxers rather
than analyzing personal feeds in these groups.
Applying social network analysis methods to Twitter conversations around
the pandemic is a popular research direction7,12,15. Although very interest-
ing, we feel that these works miss an important point. They treat Twitter
timelines as the source of data, and they focus on the behaviors displayed by
users in response to the data. Our approach stresses the fact that Twitter
itself is the source of bias and an important trigger for users’ behaviors.
Our research tries to address the problem of rising hesitancy towards
vaccination in the face of a global pandemic. We draw inspiration from
works such as ,19 where the authors analyze many tweets and identify major
themes and topics discussed in anti-vaxxer Twitterverse. Our findings seem
to confirm the hypothesis that merely exposing users to opposing views may
lead to further polarization. Bail et al. present an experiment measuring
the impact of the exposure to opposite views on liberal/conservative Twitter
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users1. We find a very similar effect concerning vaccines, but the asymmetry
is much stronger than in the case of political views.
Robert Gorwa and Douglas Guilbeault created a functional and historical
typology of bots6. This is not an ideal typology since at least three types are
hardly distinguishable from one another. Gorwa and Guilbeault differentiate
between:
• crawlers and scrapers whose primary function is to index the content
of the Web,
• chatbots that are a form of computer interface allowing human users
to interact with a machine,
• spambots, a malicious kind of bots that created unwanted, rubbish
messages,
• social bots, also known as sybils, are pieces of software producing and
spreading malicious content on social networks. Social bots interact
with human users on social media, can mimic them, and be used to
promote certain content; social bots can be used for good and bad
goals, e.g., activists can use them to promote political participation
(good goal) or to spread political misinformation (bad goal),
• sockpuppets and trolls, which are automated social media profiles with
fabricated identities that impersonate real users and interact with other
human users; they differ from social bots because they allow different
degrees of human supervision,
• cyborgs and hybrid accounts are another type of human and bot coop-
eration, which again can be used to promote valuable content on social
media, or to produce, promote or spread malicious content
Peter M. Kraft et al.9 propose a typology of bot’s intervention that is
based on certain aspects of bot’s characteristics. Intervention on actions
consists of a bot or bots behaving in a certain way, for instance, up-voting
(share or like) certain content to test users’ reactions to the “up-voted” con-
tent. Intervention on attributes requires changing some attributes of a bot’s
profile. For example, the gender of a bot retweeting certain content may
be indicated as either female or male to test the reaction of human users.
Finally, the intervention on algorithms requires differentiation between differ-
ent bot’s action patterns (for instance, modifying the frequency of retweeting
the same contents to measure human engagement).
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3 Methods
3.1 The architecture of Twitter bots
We build several bots that share the same operational procedure. The only
thing that differentiates the bots is the composition of the initial seed set
F0 of Twitter accounts that each bot follows. Let us introduce the notation
used throughout the paper.
Given a subject S and a tweet t, we use the notation t ∈ S if the tweet
concerns the subject S, and t /∈ S if the tweet t does not concern the subject
S. Furthermore, we denote the fact that the tweet t expresses a positive
attitude towards the subject S by t ∈ S+. Neutral and negative attitudes
are denoted by t ∈ S0 and t ∈ S−, respectively.
Our framework requires the training of two classifiers. A binary classi-
fier CS(t) decides whether the tweet t concerns the subject S or not. The
ternary classifier CA(t, S) decides the emotional attitude towards the subject
S expressed by the tweet t.
The procedure followed by each bot is presented in Figure 1:
• The bot is created with the seed set F0 of friends
• The bot ”wakes up” and accesses n tweets from its current timeline T
• For each accessed tweet t ∈ T the classifier CS(t) is applied to check if
t ∈ S
– if t ∈ S and t type kt ∈ {RETWEET,QUOTE,LIKE}, then
author a of the retweeted, quoted or liked tweet is added to F
(the bot starts following the author a)
• The bot ”falls asleep” for the time period τ and becomes inactive
• After the predefined number of days λ, the bot halts. We apply the
classifier CA(t, S) to all the tweets t ∈ S which the bot has ever accessed
to measure the percentage of pro-, neutral, or anti-vaccination tweets.
3.2 Data Annotation
Our system uses two different classifiers. Classifier CS(t) is used to decide
whether a given tweet is in any way related to the topic of COVID-19 vac-
cines. The primary aim of our experiment was to measure how does selective
exposure affects the polarization of views about a single topic — vaccines.
Thus, we have reduced the impact of non-vaccine-related content and taught
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Figure 1: Twitter bot routine
the bot how to identify tweets related to vaccines. All other tweets were dis-
carded from further analyses. The topic classifier trained to identify vaccine-
related tweets was trained as a binary classifier with two exclusive classes:
whether a tweet is related to vaccines or not.
To train the topic classifier CS(t), we have created a dataset contain-
ing positive examples (tweets related to COVID-19) and negative examples
(other tweets). For training the classifier, we have used open-source datasets.
The first dataset consisting of tweets related to COVID-19 vaccines is a
collection of CoVaxxy4 tweets from the period 14-17.01.2021. The second
dataset containing tweets unrelated to vaccines consists of tweets from dif-
ferent sources: celebrities dataset2, gender classification dataset11, Russian
trolls dataset14,16, and events dataset20. We have selected a sample of 200 000
tweets with the distribution of 10% positive class (tweets related to COVID-
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19) and 90% negative class (tweets not related to COVID-19). The classifier
has been trained using TextCatogerizer from the SpaCy 1 text processing
library using a convolutional neural network. The classifier reached almost
perfect classification with AUC = 0.995. Still, one should remember that the
classification task was straightforward: practically all vaccine-related tweets
contained tokens from a small vocabulary (covid, vaccine, jab, vax, cov19,
az, pfizer) and were tagged with particular hashtags (#vaccine, #covidiots,
#stayhome, #covid19), so the classifier had no problem in memorizing these
features.
The second classifier CA(t, S) was trained to discover the attitude ex-
pressed in the tweet towards the subject of COVID-19 vaccines. The train-
ing of this classifier has proven to be much more challenging. First, we have
manually annotated over 2500 tweets using the following annotation protocol.
We have assumed the existence of three classes:
• PRO: positive, the tweet unequivocally suggests support for getting
vaccinated against COVID-19
• NEUTRAL: the tweet is mostly informative, does not show emotions
vs. presented information, contains strong positive or negative emo-
tions but concerning politics (vaccine distribution, vaccine passports,
etc.)
• AGAINST: the tweet is clearly against vaccination and contains warn-
ings, conspiracy theories, etc.
Tweet annotation has been conducted using Prodigy2. The annotators
were provided with the following instructions:
• Do not spend too much time on a tweet and try to make a quick de-
cision, the slight discrepancy in labeling (especially if you are deciding
between PRO and NEUTRAL) will not affect the classifier signifi-
cantly.
• Assign tweets that seem to originate from news sites as NEUTRAL
and use PRO for tweets that express unequivocal support for getting
the vaccine.
• There are many tweets on vaccination and politics. They should fall





• Use only the contents of the tweet to label it, do not open the links if the
content of a tweet is not enough for labeling (e.g., “Hmm, interesting,
https://t.co/ki345o2i345”), skip such tweets instead of giving it a label.
• Use the option to skip a tweet only when there is nothing in the tweet
except for an URL or a few meaningless words, otherwise do not hesi-
tate to put the tweet in the NEUTRAL class.
Below we present selected examples of tweets and their respective labels.
• PRO tweets
– If you think that NHS staff should receive full COVID-19 vaccine
courses (2 doses) immediately, please RT this NHS staff are
not currently allowed 2 doses. Not even staff who are shielding
with medical conditions, who want to return to their frontline jobs
– 48 hours later, and I’m happy to report that my mom has expe-
rienced zero side effects. https://t.co/S0emF9iKLV
– Got that vaccine today
• NEUTRAL tweets
– The problem we have is that it won’t be the GP that will give the
vaccine to the care home residents. It has to go to the care home
or something.
– Actually, resigning abruptly as HHS secretary in the middle of a
surging pandemic and a vaccination crisis doesn’t seem all that
responsible. At this point, Azar should be working his ass off until
the last minute.
– Trump administration accused of deception in pledging release of
vaccine stockpile https://t.co/MD8stxYll0 via @Yahoo
– Inside Track: Behind instantaneous clearance of Bharat Biotech’s
corona vaccine https://t.co/KtYRqQGuk5
• AGAINST tweets
– If there are 23 in the tiny population of Norway, how many are
there in the US that are not being publicly revealed? Just askin’.
– Now they are forcing vaccines on we the people. We will no longer
be in charge of our own bodies. https://t.co/Ag0zyweFLS
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– So the AstraZeneca vaccine was trialed in Brazil, South Africa &
the U.K. & now we have virus mutations from these areas? Is this
not being analyzed by the media? Anyone? https://t.co/TMK
LKJ2BF3
– 1/ @cdcgov had released its updated batch of reported Covid
vaccine side effect data through Jan. 8, when roughly 6.6 million
doses had been administered. And it is... not good.
Our goal was to have an obvious distinction between AGAINST and
PRO classes, where the former expresses explicit support for vaccination,
and the latter tries to discourage the reader from getting vaccinated. All
tweets that had negative emotional valence (e.g., tweets criticizing a gov-
ernment of incompetent handling of vaccine distribution) were classified as
NEUTRAL, even if one could deduce from the tweet that an author sup-
ports the vaccination. Thus, in the following sections, the PRO class con-
tains only the tweets which explicitly encourage people to vaccinate, and all
other tweets, even if implicitly supporting vaccination efforts, were classified
as NEUTRAL.
We have asked 8 annotators to annotate the same set of 100 tweets using
the guidelines proposed in the annotation protocol to verify the annotation
protocol. We have measured the inter-rater agreement using the Fliess’ κ
coefficient5. The results were as follows:
• when measuring the agreement with four possible classes (PRO, NEU-
TRAL, AGAINST, NONE, where the last class represents tweets
that where rejected from annotation), the agreement is κ = 0.3940
• when measuring the agreement after removing tweets that were re-
jected, the agreement is κ = 0.3560
• when measuring the agreement if rejected tweets are classified as NEU-
TRAL, the agreement is κ = 0.3753
• when measuring the agreement for only two classes (using PRO, NEU-
TRAL and NONE as one class, and AGAINST as another class),
the agreement is κ = 0.5419
According to a popular interpretation of Fleiss’ κ10, the annotators are
in fair agreement in the first three scenarios and moderate agreement in the
last scenario. These results suggest that the annotators are struggling to dis-
tinguish between PRO and NEUTRAL classes, and sometimes they have
divergent opinions on whether the tweet should be rejected from training.
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Still, they are coherent when labeling AGAINST tweets. Since the main
goal of our experiment is to validate how much disparaging information (ex-
plicitly advocating against the vaccines) is presented to a Twitter user, we
conclude that the agreement between annotators is sufficient to produce a
high-quality training dataset for the classifier.
The final classifier has been trained on 2000 manually annotated tweets
related to COVID-19 vaccines. The training dataset contained 366 examples
of pro-vaccine tweets, 637 examples of anti-vaccine tweets, and 1119 examples
of tweets that were neutral. As in the case of the first classifier, we have used
the TextClassifier from SpaCy library, training the model with dropout
d = 0.4 for 100 iterations using compounding batch sizes. The baseline
AUROC was 0.470, and the training managed to improve the overall AUROC
to 0.729. The AUROCs for PRO, NEUTRAL, and AGAINST classes
were 0.706, 0.679, and 0.802, respectively. Even though the training set was
imbalanced, both classes of interest (PRO and AGAINST) are recognized
with precision and recall sufficient for the main goal of the study.
3.3 Seed Accounts for Twitter bots
This section describes our methodology for selecting accounts that will be
used to create the initial set of bot’s friends. The point of departure is
creating two lists of polarized seed accounts. The first list consists of vaccine
advocates, and the second list consists of vaccine skeptics. We define vaccine
advocates as a group of people who produce content that urges people to
get vaccinated, describe the positive effects of vaccines, debunk conspiracy
theories on COVID-19 vaccines, or present a negative attitude to vaccine
hesitancy. On the other hand, vaccine skeptics create content that warns
others about getting the vaccine, share information about exaggerated side
effects following COVID-19 vaccines, and disseminate conspiracy theories.
We queried the Twitter search engine with manually curated hashtags
such as #coronavaccine, #getvaccinated, #mRNA, #PfizerGang, #Vacci-
neNoThankYou, #vaccinesWork, #BillGatesVaccine, #VaccinesKill, etc. to
fetch tweets related to COVID-19 vaccines. Then we have searched for tweets
with conspicuous emotional load, both negative and positive. As a result, we
have identified 24 Twitter accounts with a positive attitude towards COVID-
19 vaccines (vaccine advocates) and 50 Twitter accounts with a negative
attitude towards COVID-19 vaccines (vaccine skeptics).
Then, we have manually curated 5 configurations (one configuration per
bot) of the initial seed set of friends. The parameters of bots are presented
in Table 1. As can be seen, the bots differ in the ratio of anti-vax to pro-
vax, starting with a bot that has befriended only anti-vaxxers (Anthony) and
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ending with a bot that has befriended only pro-vaxxers (Jessie). Unfortu-
nately, we could not control variables such as number of followers, number
of comments, or tweeting frequency across configurations and Twitter user
groups (advocates versus skeptics). The selection of initial friends for each
bot configuration was random, and we have not prioritized friends with many
followers or friends producing more tweets.
Table 1: Twitter bots’ initial configuration
Bot name Anti-vax ratio #anti-vaxxers #pro-vaxxers
Anthony 1.0 10 0
Alice 0.9 9 1
Julia 0.5 5 5
Alfred 0.1 1 9
Jessie 0.0 0 10
4 Results
Our bots were active for the period of 5 days (from May 18, 11:00 a.m. to
May 22, 5:00 p.m.) and were following the procedure outlined in Section 3.1.
The period τ of inactivity of the bot has been set to one hour. Table 2
presents the results of the entire experiment3. The results below do not in-
clude tweets for which COVID-19 relevance was computed below 0.50. The
attitude classifier has been re-trained on filtered data following the sugges-
tions from13. Columns marked with ”avg” represent the average score per
tweet for each class.
Table 2: Results of the experiment: number of tweets, number of friends,
and the composition of individual bots’ timelines
Bot name # tweets # covid tweets # friends PRO NEUTRAL AGAINST avg PRO avg NEUTRAL avg AGAINST
Anthony 1967 1033 772 2% 63% 35% 12% 49% 39%
Alice 392 244 40 1% 58% 41% 11% 47% 42%
Julia 2118 1084 803 2% 63% 35% 13% 49% 38%
Alfred 1594 620 794 5% 81% 14% 19% 55% 26%
Jessie 682 296 240 4% 90% 6% 18% 61% 22%
3The small number of tweets received by Alice is due to the fact that Twitter has
rejected this bot after a few days of operation from adding new friends, we could not
identify the reason behind this suspension.
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The results presented in Table 2 depict the final view of the timeline,
i.e., the analysis of the entire set of tweets ”visible” to the bot during the
entire experiment. Equally interesting is the temporal view of the change
in the composition of the bot’s timeline. Below we present the composition
of all bots’ timelines in each iteration. This view allows us to observe the
gradual change of the profile of information presented to each bot. We find
that any significant changes to the composition of the timeline happen only
during first iterations, when bots start to extend the set of followed accounts,
but (quite surprisingly) the compositions of timelines very quickly reach the
stable state, irrespective of the initial composition of the timeline.
5 Discussion
Firstly, we want to stress that the framework of experimental observation of
Twitter concerning divisive and contentious topics presented in this paper is
not limited to the subject of vaccines. It can be readily adapted to every
topic under discussion in the Twitterverse. The only action required for such
adaptation is the training of two classifiers: the topic classifier responsible
for recognizing that a tweet is relevant to the topic and the attitude classifier
responsible for discovering the attitude of the tweet to the topic. Soon, we
are planning to examine in detail the impact Twitter has on the public dis-
cussion on COVID-19 related topics such as wearing masks, lockdowns, and
vaccination passports. We also plan to extend our inquiries into other topics
which define current public discourse, such as racism, climate catastrophe,
gender equality, or acceptance of sexual minorities.
The results of the experiment are depicted in Table 2. For each bot,
we report the number of tweets in the bot’s timeline, the number of tweets
related to COVID-19, and the number of friends gathered during the exper-
iment. We also present aggregated composition of bot’s timeline in terms of
tweets that are PRO, NEUTRAL, and AGAINST the vaccines. To provide more
nuanced insight into the timelines, we also report on the averaged responses
of the CA(t, S) classifier responsible for evaluating the attitude expressed to-
wards vaccines by a tweet. When classifying a tweet t, the response of the
classifier is the distribution over three classes. For instance, the classifier
might predict that there is 70% that the tweet is pro-vaccine, 18% that the
tweet is anti-vaccine, and 12% that the tweet is neutral. We choose the label
with the highest probability to be the final label of the tweet. However, this
approach may not be representative when classifier responses are fuzzy. The
average class assignment of tweets in bot’s timeline are presented in columns
avg PRO, avg NEUTRAL, and avg AGAINST.
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(a) Anthony’s timeline (b) Alice’s timeline
(c) Julia’s timeline (d) Alfred’s timeline
(e) Jessie’s timeline
Figure 2: The timeline compositions.
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The results of our experiment are quite discouraging. We can see that
even for bots that were seeded with exclusively (or almost exclusively) pro-
vaccination friends (Jessie and Alfred), the percentage of tweets express-
ing the unwavering support for vaccination against COVID-19 is tiny, not
exceeding 5%. It quickly drops to 1%–2% for bots, allowing for a more
”balanced” seed of friends. If a bot starts with strongly anti-vaccination
friends (as is the case with Anthony and Alice), the Twitter timeline will
aggressively strengthen and affirm the anti-vaccination stance by present-
ing a large amount of anti-vaccination material. Unfortunately, this anti-
vaccination material manages to seep into timelines of bots that start with
pro-vaccination friends, and the amount of anti-vaccination propaganda is
substantial. Even if a bot does not have a single anti-vaxxer friend, she will
still see 6% of anti-vaccination tweets, and by allowing just 10% of anti-
vaccination friends, the number of anti-vaccination tweets grows to 14%. We
see the lack of symmetry between bots seeded with pro-vaccination friends
(Alfred and Jessie) and bots seeded with anti-vaccination friends (Anthony
and Alice). Trying to ”balance the opinions” leads to a disaster. Julia (who
starts with half pro-vaxxer friends and half anti-vaxxer friends) sees only 2%
of pro-vaccination tweets compared to 35% anti-vaccination tweets.
The timelines of all bots are fairly similar. However, we can observe
small departures in percentage shares of both the pro-vaccination and anti-
vaccination tweets, with the majority of tweets belonging to the NEUTRAL
class. The stability of the composition of timelines, which we observed after
just a few iterations, may be interpreted as yet another effect of information
bubbles created by Twitter. It seems that each bot is quickly reaching its
information niche and does not experience significant shifts in the distribution
of the polarity of information.
Interestingly, Anthony’s timeline (starting with a seed of 100% anti-
vaccination friends) was flooded with anti-vaccination tweets after the first
20 iterations. We do not observe a similar pattern in the case of Jessie, who
started with a seed of 100% pro-vaccination friends. The observed dispropor-
tion between the shares of pro- and anti-vaccination tweets may suggest that
anti-vaccination friends are much more active than pro-vaccination friends.
6 Ethical considerations
Bot activity in a social network can be considered as a research interven-
tion. Such an intervention alters the “natural” informational environment of
a social network available to users. The ultimate goal of the bot’s research
intervention (BRI) is to gain generalizable knowledge on either human be-
14
havior or the results of a social network algorithm that may ultimately affect
human behavior. Therefore, the BRI does not necessarily meet the definition
of research involving humans provided by the US Common Rule.
According to the US. Common Rule Research involving humans requires:
• obtaining information about an individual through intervention or in-
teraction with individual and using, studying or analyzing that infor-
mation(CFR46.101), or
• obtaining, using, studying, analyzing, or generating identifiable private
information. (CFR46.101),
Intervention is understood as physical procedures interacting with a body
of human subjects and alternations of subjects’ environment (CFR46.101).
In comparison, interaction is understood as communication or interpersonal
contact between subject and researcher (CFR46.101). These definitions are
important not only from a legal perspective but also from an ethics per-
spective. Research involving human beings may require additional ethical
scrutiny.
According to the bot classification introduced by Gorwa & Guilbeault6,
our bots best fit into the category of social bots. However, their goal is not
to interact or to target other users’ behavior. The bots are fully automated.
They do impersonate human users, but they do not communicate with other
users, and the only action they perform is to follow other users based on
the pre-programmed algorithm. Using Krafft’s et al. classification9, our bots
test an intervention on algorithms: they investigate how initial configurations
of Twitter friends impacts the exposure to the COVID-19 vaccine-related
content.
The bots employed in the current project did not involve any human
subjects. We also did not collect any data associated with individuals. It
is reasonable to conclude that our bots did not involve human beings. Nev-
ertheless, the bots were active in the human information environment, and
we should carefully assess possible ethical perils of the research. The most
obvious ethical challenge is the use of deception.
The experimental bots act under the disguise of normal human users.
Therefore, there is an element of deception: other users, especially those fol-
lowed by the experimental bots, might think that real human beings actually
follow them. However, there is a rationale not to disclose the experimental
bot’s full identity. Namely, we assume that if the bot’s identity would be
revealed: the profile would be informed that this bot tests exposure to mis-
information on COVID-19 vaccines. The experimental bots would be blocked
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by those Twitter users who oppose vaccines. These practical concerns alone
do not suffice to use deception. We deem that deception is justified by: the
goal of the study, minimal intrusiveness of the bots, transparency, and leaving
space for autonomous choice.
• The goal of the study is not to describe Twitter bias towards misinfor-
mation about COVID-19 vaccines. The COVID-19 is a serious global
health threat that can be mitigated only by public health interventions
that require massive participation. Mass vaccination against COVID-
19 is one of the most effective and economically promising solutions to
stop the spread of the Sars-Cov-2 virus, which is responsible for the
pandemic. Understanding how misinformation about COVID-19 vac-
cines is spreading in one of the globally most important social networks
is paramount.
• Minimal intrusiveness: The bots do not produce any content. Their
interference into a social network is limited to two factors: their visi-
bility as separate “users” and their action of following other accounts.
Twitter will notify users who are followed by the bots that they have
a new follower. A human user may indeed infer the false information
that there is someone interested in her tweets. We mitigate this risk by
providing explicit information in bots’ profiles (exposing the fact that
these are bots) and limiting the experiment to a relatively short time
span. The interaction between human users and our bots is minimal
and does not produce any unusual or additional risk.
• Transparency and debrief : The actions of our bots are described ahead
of launching the project at the project website 4, and this information
is disseminated by the project Twitter profile @webimmunization.
• Space for autonomous choice and opt-out option: The bots intervention
still leaves space for users to make an autonomous decision if they want
to be followed by the experimental bot. A human user who concludes
that information contained in the bot’s profile is insufficient, too general
or suspicious, has the freedom to block the bot.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a method for evaluating the composition of the
Twitter timeline conditioned on the initial selection of friends when engaging
4www.webimmunization.cm-uj.krakow.pl
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in divisive and contentious topics of public discourse. As an example of such
discourse, we analyze social media interactions related to the COVID-19
pandemic and the public sentiment towards vaccines and vaccination pro-
grams. We observe a strong asymmetry between the anti-vaccination and
pro-vaccination sides of the discourse. While bots initialized as highly pro-
vaccination received mostly neutral tweets in their timelines, bots initialized
as highly anti-vaccination received firm support for their anti-vaccination
stance. People who are convinced of the efficacy and usefulness of COVID-
19 vaccines do not tend to enforce this stance among other pro-vaccine users.
At the same time, anti-vaxxers seem to strengthen and fortify their message
among other anti-vaxxers constantly. Of course, the procedure executed by
our bots is a simplification of real human interaction with the Twitter ser-
vice. Nevertheless, we feel that our results can be projected onto non-bot
timelines and that these results provide an interesting insight into the effects
of Twitter on the public discourse.
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